A Metaphysical Disputation on the Principle of the Individual

Leibniz's Bachelor Thesis

1. How widespread is this our coming argument, that in truth there should be fewer words wasted on it; all the more should we abstain from a preface, unless to be reminded of the Divine Intelligence by a deserved and just invocation. For God, the first Act and Fount of all following things, we pray and beseech, in Whom the Cause itself is, that He Himself wishes to be aroused in our understanding, to Whom all goodness is owed, and to no one else.

2. First of all, however, we shall examine the state of the question. For we will discuss the principle of the individual (or the principle of individuation), where both the principle and the individual have been understood in various ways. For the word ‘individual’, as the word universal, has been understood as to either be logical in the order of predication (or names)(nominalism), or to be metaphysical in the order of things (realism). So either it is in reality, or it is in concept, or as others say, it is formal or fundamental. And formally it could be either of every individual, or of the whole creation, or of the whole substance, or of material substance. The word ‘Principle’ can also denote multiple things, namely both the principle of knowing and the principle of being. And this of being both internal and external. Therefore, to sum this up: we will discuss something real and, as they say, a physical principle, which is the formal reason (d’etre) of the individual, or of individuation, and whether numerical differences in the intellect are its foundation; and this especially in created, substantial individuals.

3. Indeed, because as sparks are emitted by the friction of flint, so, by comparing opinions, the truth is revealed, let us first arrange the important ones. There are generally two kinds of opinions on this matter: some have hypotheses applicable to all individuals, like Scotus; others, like Thomas, see in bodies matter as their principle, but in Angels place their essence as their principle. But we, abstracting now from material and immaterial substance, will consider these specific questions at some other time, and now focus on examining the general ones. Of these general questions we count four: For (1) either the principle of individuation is posited as a whole entity or not a whole entity; (2) If not whole, it either signifies a negation or something positive; (3) If it expresses something positive, this is either a physical part terminating essence or existence; or (4) a metaphysical part, terminating species or haecceitas.

4. The first opinion, since it is defended by the most esteemed men and removes all difficulties, will also be accepted by us, the confirmation of which will provide a general argument against the rest. I posit therefore: every individual is individuated by its entire/whole entity/essence. And Petrus Aureolus held this view, as mentioned by Johannes Capreolus, who diligently refuted him, see 2. sent. d. 3. q. 2. Herveus, quodlib. 3. q. 9. And Soncinas says that this opinion belongs to the Terminists or Nominalists, see 7. Met. q. 31. And indeed, Gregory of Rimini holds it, see 1. sent. d. 17. q. 4. And also Gabriel Biel in 2. sent. d. 3. q. 1, whom the more recent Nominalist Schautheet cites in 1. 2. Contra. 5. artic. 1. The same view is held by Durandus, in 2. d.3. q.2., being cited by many in this way, although, as Murcia notes, in disp. 7. in I. 1. Physic. Ar. q. 1., he is often cited for the mention of the form alone, yet in n. 15, he expressly presents both matter and form. However, Ramoneda wrongly divides those who say that the individual individuates itself, and those who say that matter and form provide this, treating them as mutually exclusive, when they are rather subordinate, like the particular to the general. For what else is the matter and form united if not the whole composite entity? Take note that here we abstract from bodies and angels; thus we use the term whole entity instead of using the terms matter and form. And the same view is held by Fr. Murcia, I. c; Fr. Suarez, disp. Met. 5; Zimara in Mercenar. disp. de. P. I. P. I. c.9; Perer. I.6 c.12; and most recently by Pl. Reverend. Calov. Met. Part. Spec. tr.1. art. 1. c.3. n.2; and B. Stahl. Comp. Met. c.35.

5. The arguments for this view are generally as follows:
   Argument 1. Through what something is, through that it is one in number.
   But any thing is through its own being/entity: Thus the major premise is proven, because nothing real is added by ‘being one’ which is not already in ‘being’. All the defenders of this view have used this argument. But Bassolius the Scotist responded by denying the major premise: for he says that the nature and entity/being of a thing differ formally, not really. And in this way would he limit the premise: through what a thing is, it is really one in number, and in this sense the major premise is conceded: but if the same is understood formally, it is denied. And against the proof he can say that ‘one’ adds a formal difference beyond mere ‘being’. But this will be refuted below in the refutation of Scotus.

6. Mercenarius also denies the major, and says against the proof that it is in fact not one in species, but that it still adds something more than mere being. But on the contrary: that which it adds, if it is something real, will itself also be a being, therefore it will add something beyond itself. If, however, he says that he is not speaking of every being, which also includes the modes (of being), I press the point: That which is added beyond numerical unity is a being. If, therefore, it is one in number but separated from what is added, numerical unity adds nothing; But if not, there will be given some real being that is not singular, which will be discussed below. I ignore that Mercenarius responded in the Scotist manner, even though he favors Thomas.

7. Ramoneda responds: 'one' and 'being' differ formally, although materially they are the same. To ‘differ formally’ he understand as to differ by reason. Thus the principles of 'one' and 'being' also differ by reason. Soncinas says, on Aristotle's Metaphysics IV.2, that he takes this argument under consideration, not speaking of numerical unity, but transcendental unity. Truly, that (unity) is also transcendent, and there is no real unity of species, besides numerical unity. Someone other could also respond in favor of all opposing views from the foundation on which they differ from us, namely that individuals become one in number through their entity, but not wholly. However, the objection is that the other part is also inherently one in number, and it would follow that if the internal principles of one and being differ as whole and part, then one and being also differ as whole and part, and that thus indeed, some being is added beyond one. And these things about this argument are explained in greater detail, so that it may be seen more clearly, and each person may seek their own escapes.
   Argument 2: The principles of being in the universal are the principles of being in the singular. But the entire entity is the universal principle of being in the universal. Thus the major premise is with probability proven by analogy, because the universal principles differ in no other way from the singular, except that they are abstracted from many similar singulars. And this is Stahl’s argument. Argument 3: From Durandus: the universal and the singular do not differ really: Therefore, they have the same principles: Therefore, the entire entity, which is the principle of universality, will be that also of singularity.

8. For example, in Socrates, there is a nature determined intrinsically to him outside the intellect, which Soncinas grants, and if he were to deny it, an argument would be given against the Thomists that there would then be a complete universal in the things. Indeed, Bassolius the Scotist also says that the universal exists only potentially in the thing, namely as the singular nature in relation to the intellect, with which it can be compared to similar things (to form the universal). Furthermore, is there then also an indifferent nature in Socrates? If not, it is now clear that the nature of Socrates individuates itself; if so, then both a different and an indifferent human nature will be present in Socrates. Nor does Soncinas escape by saying that the different and the indifferent differ in reason. For thus it is clear that nature is determined in the thing by itself, not by something other added to it.

9. Argument 5. Some essence, for example, the humanity of Socrates, either differs in number from the humanity of Plato intrinsically, if indeed we abstract that which is superadded to nature from outside itself, or not. If it differs in number intrinsically, it individuates itself. If not, it follows that the humanity of Plato and Socrates are the same in number. Just as one nature can be compared with another nature, so it could also be compared in what is added to it. But this I now set aside.

10. The arguments to the contrary are few and of little significance.
    I. Whatever constitutes an individual materially does not constitute it formally. But the entity constitutes the individual materially. Therefore etc - I respond by denying the major premise, asserting that the material and formal aspects of an individual, or species and individual, do not differ in reality.
    II. If essence lacks existence in itself and does not imply it, it follows that it is indifferent in itself. But the opposite is true; because what can be conceived under the opposite of something does not exclude it. But without existence, essence can be and be conceived: Therefore etc. - I respond: Essence is either taken as it is in the intellect and as a quidditative concept, so existence is not part of the essence's definition; or as it is in reality: in that case, I deny that it can be without existence.
    III. The proper unity of essence, namely formal or specific, is less than numerical unity: Therefore, it does not belong to it inherently, since its opposite inherently belongs to it -- I respond by denying the premise concerning unity outside of the intellect.
    These are most of Soncinatis' arguments in Book I, Question 7 on the Metaphysics, Question 31. He also objects concerning accidents, which, differing only in number, cannot be in the same subject at the same time, which, however, is false; likewise, about the parts of the continuous being separated. But we have excluded accidents and incomplete beings from our discussion.

11. The second opinion is that which posits negation as the principle of individuation. Whether anyone has ever held this view, I greatly doubt, unless perhaps some more obscure Nominalist. Moreover, it is all the more suspicious that Bassolius reports some who have said that the principle of individuation consists of existence (combined) with a double negation, which is quite improbable and has no relevance. Furthermore, others who were mindful of this did not include existence. Bassolius himself also, as if there were two opinions, separately refutes (the arguments on) existence and negations. However, it could hardly be entirely from a Nominalist perspective that this is defended; for they presuppose that the universal is more of a being (is of greater being) than the singular. However, whatever may be said about who has held this opinion, the opinion can be conceived in such a way that from the highest genus, determined by differences, you descend to subalterns, and then to the lowest species: but there it does not descend further, and the negation of further descent is the intrinsic formal principle of the individual. And this would be the opinion about the individual, just as Occam said about the point, which he mentioned in Logic. praedic. quant. and tr. de Eucharistia, as reported by Pererius in I. 10. c. 5, that a surface is nothing other than a body with the negation of extension in depth, a line a surface with the negation of extension in width, and a point a line with the negation of extension in length. The former negation of division is like a general principle of the individual, while the other negation of identity with another will make this individual truly distinct from another (individual).

12. This opinion Mercenarius discusses in "Dilucidationes de Principio Individuationis," Part 1, Chapter 2, and Bassolius also elaborately on the Sentences, Book 2, Distinction 12, Question 4, Article 1. Their foundation is that they were convinced that no positive principle (of individuation) could be established. But they do not see how nature could individuate itself. They can be easily opposed: Either the individual is constituted by negations outside of the intellect, or by negations in the intellect. If the latter is the case, their response does nothing to address the issue; if the former is the case: how can a positive being be constituted by a negative? Furthermore, negation cannot produce individual accidents; for every negation is of some positive thing, otherwise it would only be in word, not in reality. Let us for example say that there are two individuals, Socrates and Plato: and the principle of Socrates would be the negation of Plato, and the principle of Plato the negation of Socrates; then there would be nowhere something positive, and nowhere to stand firm. Cf. other strong arguments in Bassolius.

13. The third opinion is that existence is the principle of individuation. Fr. Murcia attributes this view to a certain Carthusian in 2. Sentences, Distinction 3. I do not know whether it is Dionysius Rikelius (but it is at least certain that he wrote on the Sentences); Fonseca attributes it to Nicolaus Bonetus defending it in 8. Metaphysics, Chapter 1, and in 5. Metaphysics, Chapter 6, Question 2, part 1. This opinion can however be understood in two ways: firstly, that real existence is a mode intrinsically individuating a thing, distinct from its essence on the part of the thing; if this is the case, it can hardly be defended, as will soon be clear. But if secondly it is understood as differing only conceptually from the essence, it coincides perfectly with our view and further expresses in what respect essence is the principle of individuation. And thus I understand the Most Excellent Scherzer, my mentor, to be followed with the utmost care, on question 43 of the Breviarium Metaphysicum by Eustachius de S. Paulo.

14. Therefore, we must primarily engage with those who are refuted by Scotus on Sentences 2, Distinction 3, Question 4, and his follower Bassolius in the same place, Question 4, Article 1, f. 179. However, I argue: I. If essence and existence are the same on the part of the thing, it follows that existence, as my opponents understand it, is not the principle of individuation. But the first premise is true: Therefore, so is the second. I prove the minor premise fundamentally as follows: Whatever really differs can be separated from each other: Therefore etc. Those responding to the major premise such as Capreolus, 1. d.8. q.1., and Cajetanus de Ente et Essentia, q.11., are of no significance. The minor premise is proven, partly because essence cannot be removed, and partly the same for existence.

15. Let me prove this in this way: Everything that is removed exists, after cutting it off from that from which it is removed; for removal, as an action, ends at that from which it is removed. Therefore, essence exists, after cutting it off from existence. That existence cannot be removed from essence, is denied by the opponents, whose lengthy series of arguments you can see in Peter of Posnania the Scotist, I. 1. Sentences, Distinction 36, Question Unique, page 976. But I argue against this: Essence, removed from existence, is either a real being or nothing. If nothing, either it was not in creatures, which is absurd, or it was not distinct from existence, which I agree with. But if it is a real being, it was either purely potential or actual being. Without a doubt it must be the latter; for it cannot be actual, except through existence, which we had just presupposed to be separated. If, then, essence is purely potential, all essences are prime matter. But two purely potential things do not differ, not even in relation to act, because this relation, since it is to a potential being, is not real. If, then, essences do not differ from matter, it follows that only matter is the essential part, and that things do not differ in species, for example, the essence of a brute beast would not differ from the essence of a human. For neither includes form, which is the principle of specific distinction, and two purely potential things do not differ. And if you say they differ through relations to the Ideas: that relation is not real, for this would merely be an accident in GOD. Regarding the distinction between essence and existence, see Posnaniensis 1. c. Soncin. 1. 4. Met. q. 12. and I.9. M. q.3; Fonsec IV. Met. q.4. Per.I.6. c.14; Bassolius opposes existence in 1. c. Soncin. 7. Met. q. 32; Ramoned also on Thomas, de Ente et Essentia, p. 399.

16. In the fourth and final place, Scotus offers his "haecceity" to the contest, which he introduced in 2. Sentences, Distinction 3, Question 6, as attested by Zabarella in his book "De Constitutionibus Individuis", Chapter 8, "Quodlibet", Question 2, Article 3, and in the Commentary on the Fifth Metaphysics, volume 12. Scotus' disciples (as Mercenarius recalls in response to a certain Scotist's challenge to his own opinion) vigorously defended it as if under oath. Among them, Johannes de Bassolis is quite ancient, from whom you can confidently glean his meaning, though he may be preceded by Occam, as he holds none of his opinions against Scotus.

17. It is well-known that Scotus was an extreme Realist, because he posited that universals have true reality outside the mind, while Thomas wanted their form to originate from the intellect. However, to avoid leaning towards the opinion attributed by Aristotle to Plato, he invented a formal distinction to cover up the error, acknowledging that there would indeed be something prior to the operation of the intellect, yet still saying that it has a relation to it. He believed that the genus is distinguished from the difference, and consequently, numerical difference distinguished from species: since he had presupposed that universals are real, either out of a desire to contradict, or because he thought Thomas' opinion inexplicable, and the Nominalists' view incredible, and thus it was necessary for singular things to arise from the universal plus something else added to it. Just as there is a proportion between genus and species, so too between species and individual, therefore, as there is a specific difference there, he concluded that there is an individuating difference here.

18. To evade the authority of Aristotle, he called this the ‘matter of the whole’. For, he said, the form of the whole, for example, humanity, is like the abstraction of man, which is opposed by the matter of the whole, namely, haecceity; as the form of the part, the rational soul, is opposed by the body as the matter of the part. But that is nothing; for if haecceity is the matter of the whole, it has to constitute the concrete human being along with humanity. But that only constitutes this human being, therefore, another true matter of the whole must be given, which constitutes man in the universal. Not to mention that this haecceity would rather be a form, for it unites and distinguishes; moreover, if, as most of the ancients wish, cf. Perer. I.6. c.6, according to Aristotle, only the form contains the essence of a thing, and matter is only the vehicle, the form of the whole and part are the same in Aristotle; cf. Mercen I. c.5. and throughout the Apology, and Zab. I. c.8 and 10.

19. Scotus does not admit existence, although he formally distinguishes it from essence; because for him, the species exists apart from haecceity. Petrus Fonseca defends Scotus from the more recent authors, although he is cited by Murcia in support of our opinion, see his Metaphysics, chapter 6, question 5. And see also Eustachius a St. Paulo in the first chapter. Conversely, surprisingly, there are those who align Suarez with Scotus, because he asserts in Disputationes Metaphysicae, book 5, section 11, number 16, that to an individual is added something above the common nature, which is distinct in reason. But the last words easily dispel this cloud. For most concede that an individual difference is given through the operation of the mind: so can Fr. Oviedo and the like really be considered Scotists for this reason? First, however, I will lay down and resolve the foundations of Scotus, after, with my machines brought in, I will attack.

20. The first argument for Scotus, brought forth by himself and reviewed by Pererius in Book 1, Chapter 6, is: Every unity follows some entity, therefore also numerical (unity); However, that entity is not included in the species. Therefore, something is added to it, namely the individual difference. I respond: Unity follows entity in concept, but in reality they are the same. Nor does numerical entity differ from specific entity in reality (but only conceptually). The second argument: A species is not contracted through form, matter, or accidents, etc.: Therefore, what remains (to contract it) is haecceity. I respond: It is contracted by nothing, because outside the mind it does not exist. The third argument: Things that differ, differ by some primary difference. Therefore, Socrates and Plato differ by the ultimate difference, namely haecceity. I respond: I limit what differs: unless things are a primary difference themselves, and differ from themselves, by some etc; thus I deny the minor premise.

21. The fourth argument: The species contracts the genus through specific difference. Therefore, the individual contracts the species through numerical difference. I respond: I deny the antecedent outside the mind. The fifth: Fonseca, l. c.: Individuals are under some univocal nature. Therefore, some include things that are primarily differentiated. I respond as before. The sixth: Bassolius:Specific nature has a lesser numerical unity by itself, and another from it in reality. Therefore --- etc. I respond: I deny the antecedent. For the proof see below. The argument has been twisted especially by Suez, Dilucid. 1. 5., Zimara and Mercenarius, with whom see l.c. c.5. Yet no one responded in this (mental) direction, because they relied on other foundations.

22. I argue against Scotus: I. If genus and difference are only distinguished in reason, there is no individual difference. But the antecedent is true. Therefore the major is evident; for even species and numerical difference are only distinguished in reason. The minor is proved: 1. Things that differ before the operation of the mind are separable. But genus and differences cannot be separated. Although there are some places in Scotus where he asserts that perhaps God could make universals exist outside of singulars, and similarly genus outside of species, I prove that this is absurd, because no adequate division would exist: there could be an animal neither rational nor irrational, and motion neither direct nor oblique. Higher differences are predicated of lower ones. For example, this (specific) rationality is rationality (in general). Therefore, the specific difference includes the difference of the genus in itself. Therefore, it does not differ from the genus. For the genus with its added difference has the difference of its own genus, which is also included by it. And so on up to the highest. And because sometimes it must be stopped, Aristotle said: Being is predicated of the differences. See also Soncin. 1.7. q.36 and 37.

23. II. If universals do not exist before the operation of the mind, there is no composition before the operation of the mind from the universal and the individuating. For there is no real composition whose members are not all real. But the antecedent is true. Therefore, the minor is proved: Everything that differs in reality from another before the operation of the mind in such a way that neither is part of the other, either wholly or in part, can be separated from the other. For in things that are adequately different, neither needs the other for its being. Therefore, it can be separated by the absolute power of God, and only a part from a whole, such that it remains, is simply inseparable. The minor is proved thus: for there would be a line that is neither straight nor curved in reality, which is most absurd. See Ruv. log. de universal. q. 4.

24. III. If there is no formal distinction, haecceity collapses. But the antecedent is true: Therefore etc. Before we prove this, some discussion about this distinction is necessary. Stahl's Comp. Metaph. c.23, Soncin's I.7. q.35, and Posnaniensis's 1. sent. d.34. dubio 64 may here be relevant. It is commonly attributed to Scotus to have held a middle ground between the real and the rational, hence his followers are called Formalists. He believes that this distinction applies to the Divine attributes, and the personal relations from essence, the quiddities of things among themselves and from God in known being, superior predicates from inferior ones, genus from differences, essence from existence: Rhada explains it as being between two realities or formalities, identified in the subject, but diverse in relation to the intellect; differing from the distinction of reason, which requires this before the actual operation of the mind. Indeed, when it comes to applying this in practice, things get quite complex and inconsistent. For if haecceity only differs from species in its ability to distinctly move the intellect, then why is it erroneously attributed to the principle of individuation, which should be sought by excluding intellect? So it is necessary to seek for something greater laying beneath their words. But that will be absurd, whatever it may be, for as soon as the intellect is cut off, they differ, they are no longer identical to each other.

25. Posnaniensis interprets those formalities as: objective concepts, and intelligible reasons, or things in relation to formal concepts in the mind. But that is nothing; for the formal concept is rather based on the objective, so if also the objective were in the formal, there would be a circle, and while each grounded the other, neither would be grounded, and both would vanish. Then that reason of intelligibility would be either: related to the divine concept or Ideas, but here that relation would not be real; for an accident does not befall God. Then nothing would remain for the distinction on the side of the thing; or to the word of the created mind, as they call it. But if all created intellect were removed, that relation would perish, and yet things would be individualized, therefore then by themselves. Add to this, that if that relation were real, it would have its haecceity, for it would be singular, and so on ad infinitum. Furthermore, it is related to being in potentiality, or the formal concept, which can exist, and if you say that this relation formally differs from the term, I similarly inquire about the relation of this relation to infinity. For it would also need a relation to the intellect itself.

26. IV. It is inexplicable how individual accidents arise from haecceity; for according to our view, it can easily be explained, because there are given dispositions of matter to form, but none of species to haecceity. See Herveus, Quodlibet 3, q.9, against Scotus, Pererius l.c., and Scaliger Exerc. 307 to Cardan, No. 17.

    And so, aided by Divine help, we have solved the general opinions.

COROLLARIA:

I. Matter has in itself an entitative act.

II. It is not entirely improbable that matter and quantity are really the same.

III. The essences of things are like numbers.

IV. The essences of things are not eternal except as they are in God.

V. The penetration of dimensions is possible.

VI. Man has only one soul, which virtually includes the vegetative and sensitive.

VII. I would believe that the letters attributed to the Tyrant Phalaris are spurious. For the Sicilian Dorians were there, and this style of speaking is Attic. Add that Atticism was harder at that time, like Thucydides, but this smells of Lucian's age. Certainly, where the burning of Perillus hangs, the author reveals himself as a declaimer.

That’s all.