PART I.
THAT THE EXISTENCE OF CORPOREAL PHENOMENA CANNOT BE EXPLAINED WITHOUT AN INCORPOREAL PRINCIPLE, I.E. GOD.
The man of divine genius, Francis Bacon of Verulam, rightly said that philosophy, when sipped, leads away from God, but when fully drunk brings right back to Him. This we experience in our present age, which is equally fertile in science and impiety. For when, with the mathematical arts most excellently cultivated, and the inner workings of things explored through Chemistry and Anatomy, it appeared that the reasons for the existence of many things could be explained mechanically by the shape and motion of bodies, which the ancients attributed either to the Creator alone or to unknown incorporeal forms, some ingenious individuals first began to consider whether natural (corporeal) phenomena could be accounted for and explained without assuming God or bringing Him into the reasoning. Then, when they had succeeded a little (before, namely, they had come to the foundations and principles), as if prematurely betraying their own security, they divulged that neither God nor the immortality of the soul could be found by natural reason, but that belief in this matter was owed either to civil precepts or through historical processes. So thought the most subtle Hobbes, deserving of silence in this place due to his inventions, unless one were to specifically oppose his authority, which would here worsen matters. Ah, how I wish that others, having progressed further down the road, now doubting the authority of Sacred Scripture, the truth of the histories, and the accounts of the histories, had not obscurely introduced atheism to the world!
This truly seemed to me highly unworthy, namely for our mind to be dazzled by its own light, that is, by philosophy. Therefore, I began to devote myself to the inquiry of things, all the more vehemently as I bore with less patience the fact that I was being deprived of the greatest good of life, namely the certainty of eternity after death, and the hope of divine benevolence eventually manifesting itself to the good and innocent, by the subtleties of these innovators.
Setting aside prejudices, and with expanded faith in Scripture and history, I approach the anatomy of bodies with my mind, attempting to discern whether it is possible to explain the things that appear in bodies to the senses without assuming an incorporeal cause.
At the outset, with today's philosophers being revivers of Democritus and Epicurus, whom Robert Boyle not ineptly calls Corpusculars, I may easily concur with Galileo, Bacon, Gassendi, Descartes, Hobbes, and Digby, in maintaining that in explaining the reasons for corporeal phenomena, there is no need to resort to God or any other incorporeal form or quality without necessity.
(Nor should God intervene, unless a difficult knot requires that a divine hand should arise). But everything, as far as it can be done, should be derived from the nature of the body and its primary qualities: magnitude, figure, and motion.
But what if I demonstrate that the origin of even these primary qualities cannot be found in the nature of the body? Then, I hope, our naturalists will realize that bodies cannot suffice for themselves nor can they exist without an incorporeal principle. Here I will demonstrate this neither obscurely nor circuitously.
If indeed these qualities cannot be deduced from the nature of a body, it is clear that they cannot exist in bodies considered in themselves. For the reason for any attraction must be derived either from the thing itself or from something extrinsic. Now, the definition of ‘body’ is to exist in space. And all men say that a body is that which they find in some space. So this definition consists of two terms, namely space and existence.
From the term 'space' arises magnitude and figure in a body. For a body immediately has the same magnitude and figure as the space it occupies. But a doubt remains as to why it fills such a space rather than another, and thus why, for example, it is three-footed rather than two-footed, or why it is square rather than round. The reason for this cannot be explained by the nature of bodies, for the same matter is indeterminate to any shape, whether square or round. Therefore, only two answers can be given: either the proposed body has been square from eternity, or it became square due to the impact of another body - if you do not wish to resort to an incorporeal cause. If you say it has been square from eternity, you do not provide a reason by that very statement, for why could it not have been spherical from eternity? Indeed, eternity can be understood as the cause of nothing. If you say it became square due to the motion of another body, a doubt remains as to why it had such and such a shape before that motion; and if you again refer the reason to the motion of another, and so on infinitely, then by extending your responses throughout infinity, the same question will arise, showing that there is never a lack of ground for seeking the reason of the given reason, and thus a satisfying reason will never be given. Therefore, it will appear that from the nature of bodies, a reason for a specific shape and magnitude cannot be provided.
We said that the definition of body has two parts: space and existence; and from the term 'space,' some magnitude and figure arise, but not determined, as we have shown; however, the term 'existence' in that space pertains to motion, for when a body begins to exist in a different space than before, it moves from its previous space. But upon closer examination, it will appear that while mobility arises from the nature of the body, motion itself does not. For as long as the body is proposed in one space, it can also exist in another space equal and similar to the previous one, that is, it can move. For the ability to be in another space than before is the ability to change space, and the ability to change space is the ability to move. Motion is in fact simply a change of space. However, actual motion does not arise from the simple state of existence in space, but rather from the opposite state of motion, namely the remaining in the same space, or what we call ‘rest’. Therefore, the reason for motion cannot be found in bodies considered in themselves. It is foolish, therefore, of those who explain the reason for motion as follows: every body either has been in motion from eternity or is moved by another adjacent and moving body. For if they say the proposed body has been in motion from eternity, it is not clear why it did not rather remain at rest from eternity, for time, even infinite time, cannot be understood as the cause of motion. If they say the proposed body is moved by another adjacent and moving body; and that, in turn, by another, ad infinitum; they have given no more reason why the first, second, third, or any subsequent body moves than they have for why the body moves, by which all preceding bodies are moved. For the reason for a conclusion is not clearly given as long as the reason for the reason is not given. Especially when this doubt remains endlessly unresolved.
Therefore, I believe it has been sufficiently demonstrated that a determined shape and magnitude, and also a specific motion, cannot exist in bodies left to themselves. I will leave it at this point - for there is another matter for deeper investigation, as we have not yet found the cause of the consistency of bodies from any nature inherent in the bodies themselves.
Consistency of bodies consists of the following points: 1. A large body not yielding to a small one pushing it. 2. Bodies or parts of bodies adhering to each other, from which arise those tactile qualities commonly called secondary, namely solidity, fluidity; hardness, softness; smoothness, roughness; tenacity, fragility; friability, ductility, malleability, fusibility. 3. A hard body rebounding from another body not yielding to it.
Briefly then, there are three aspects to consistency: resistance, cohesion, and reflection. I will gladly acknowledge anyone as a great philosopher who can explain these to me based on the shape, magnitude, and motion of matter. There seems to be a way to almost explain it, namely that a body resists and rebounds from another because its parts are imperceptibly moved towards its surface upon collision.
But let us assume that the impacting body does not strike along the line where the parts of the body being struck will meet, but at an angle, perhaps obliquely; then all resistance, cohesion, and reflection should cease, which is contrary to our experience. However, the reason for cohesion arising from reaction and motion, in general, cannot be clearly explained.
For if I push a part of paper, the part I push yields; hence, some reaction and resistance cannot be denied. But not only does it yield, it also takes away the other parts adhering to it. Indeed, this is true and there is a reason which Democritus, Leucippus, Epicurus, and Lucretius, and today their followers Pierre Gassendi and Johannes Chrysostomus Magnenus, have passed on: the cause of all cohesion in bodies is certain involved shapes, namely hooks, loops, rings, protrusions—in short, all curvatures or positions of two bodies interlocking with each other.
But these very solid involving instruments must be tenacious to perform their function and hold together the parts of bodies. But where does this tenacity come from? Do we suppose an infinite regression of hooks upon hooks? But the reason for doubting in the first will also be in the second and third without end. To these most sharp difficulties, these philosophers have nothing further to answer than to suppose, in the ultimate resolution of bodies, certain indivisible particles, which they call atoms, that produce various qualities of sensible bodies by their various shapes and combinations. But in these ultimate particles, there appears to be no reason for their own cohesion and indivisibility.
The ancients did offer an explanation, but it was so inadequate that modern thinkers are ashamed of it. They said namely that the parts of atoms adhere because there is no vacuum between them; from which it would follow that all bodies which have once touched each other should adhere inseparably, following the example of atoms, because in every contact of body with body, there is no vacuum. There is nothing more absurd than such perpetual cohesion, nothing more contrary to experience. Therefore, rightly, in explaining the atoms, we must ultimately resort to God, who provides stability to these ultimate foundations of things. And I wonder that neither Gassendi nor any other among the sharpest philosophers of this age noticed this excellent opportunity to demonstrate the divine existence. For it appears that in the ultimate resolution of bodies, nature cannot exist without the assistance of God.
Having demonstrated that bodies cannot possess a determined shape and quantity, and that they cannot have motion unless an incorporeal Being is postulated, it easily becomes apparent that this incorporeal Being must be the same for all things, due to the harmony among all things, especially since bodies have motion not individually from their incorporeal entity but from each other. However, why this incorporeal Being should choose one magnitude, shape, or motion over another cannot be explained unless this Being is Intelligent, and Wise, due to the beauty of things, and Powerful, due to their obedience to its command. Such an incorporeal Being will therefore have to be the Mind governing the entire world, that is, God.
PART II
THE IMMORTALITY OF THE HUMAN MIND IMMEDIATELY DEMONSTRATED
The human mind is a being whose action is thought.
A being whose action is thought is a thing both (1.) immediately sensible, for the mind feeling itself thinking is immediate to itself and (2.) a sensible thing without the imagination of its parts. This is clear to anyone experiencing it. Thought is this very thing we sense when we feel ourselves thinking. However, for example, when we feel we have a thought of Titius, we do not just sense that we had an image of Titius in mind, which indeed has parts, because this alone is not sufficient for thought.
For we have an image in mind even when we do not think of that specific person; but we also sense that we have sensed that image of Titius, in which, with the very act of noticing, we discern in it no further parts of the imagination.
A being whose action is something immediately sensible without the imagination of its parts is a being without parts.
For what is sensed immediately is such.
The cause of error is the medium, because if the object of the senses were the cause of error, it would always be sensed falsely; if the subject, it would always sense falsely.
A being whose action is without parts is not in motion.
For every motion has parts, as demonstrated by Aristotle and confessed by all.
A being whose action is not motion is not a body.
For every action of a body is motion. Indeed, every action of a thing is a variation of its essence.
The essence of a body is: to exist in space; variation of existence in space is motion.
Therefore, every action of a body is motion.
Whatever is not a body is not in space.
For the definition of a body is to exist in space.
Whatever is not in space is not mobile.
For motion is a change of space.
Whatever is not mobile is indivisible.
For dissolution is motion in parts.
Everything indivisible is incorruptible.
For corruption is an internal dissolution.
Everything incorruptible is immortal.
For death is the corruption of a living thing, or the dissolution of its machine by which it appears to move.
Therefore, the human mind is immortal.
Q.E.D.